Definition of Godhood
Why do we listen to all those claiming to believe in god? And why are we supposed to accept, so blindly, any of those gods?
Is it because we are missing a proper Definition of Godhood? And, if that is the case, how can we get one?
As a practical experiment, let’s stack two sheets of paper on top of each other. Simple, can be done by anyone and, just as anyone, we can leave the top sheet blank.
To carry out the experiment, we simply turn to the second sheet and, just as anyone else can, we write the word GOD. Then, as the next step in the experiment, and as anyone has to, we ask: "What does it mean?"
Here, because the word is not our own, and because we only have pseudo-definitions of gods, we decide to sift through all of them to try and find labels common to all gods. Even if only to set a standard of godhood precise enough to insure that only real gods will qualify as worthy candidates.
First, we notice that God, the Concept, claims to be ultimate. Stripped of all artistic licence, it claims, or is claimed, to be ultimate. After all who would want to be, or be the champion of, a less than ultimate god?
Second, we notice that God, the Concept, also has, or is said to have, authority. After all, without having authority, how can, ultimate, define a proper candidate for godhood?
And third, we find that God, the Concept, also has, or is said to have, choice. Stated another way, how can God, the Concept, ultimate, authority, be God, the Concept, ultimate, authority, without choice?
In other words, we find that all definitions of God, the Concept, can each be listed as a proper definition of God, the Concept, if and only if they include, or are said to include, at least, three linked labels: ultimate, authority and choice.
Here we could conclude the experiment. And have a greater measure of confidence when we meet both believers and atheists. If god doesn't exist why do we talk about god. And if we have the word god, against the background of godhood, why insist on the need to believe instead of simply testing?
But, in sifting through all definitions of gods, we were also told about demigods, "lesser" gods. Gods, who may have the proper three features of godhood: ultimate, authority, choice. But who nevertheless are, or are said to be, somehow, lesser than other gods.
How can that be? Should we pretend that we don't need to salvage so-called lesser gods? Or, should we, instead, dare to push a little further? And see what gives?
In the first part of the experiment, we wanted to set the bar high enough to make sure that any proposed gods really are gods. Now we need to test actual definitions of all those gods. And because we need to test those definitions, we are stuck with the artistic licence, the faith or even the reason of those who propose their candidate.
Here, to say the least, we have wide ranging definitions. We have definitions of gods who rule the sky, gods who rule the sea, gods who are faster, gods who are stronger. We have definitions of gods about everything and gods who claim to rule everything. Not only do we have definitions of gods pre-empting the claims of other gods, we also have gods outbidding the claims of other gods. We even have definitions of gods "borrowing" the claims of other gods.
But will we ever be able to escape the master-slave mentality if we accept definitions of so-called “lesser gods” as valid justifications of inequality rather than as noteworthy differences? Should we actually celebrate those gods who regard others as inferior rather than those gods who embrace the dynamic productivity that can only be found in diversity?
In our experiment, we defined godhood to, at least, include three linked labels: ultimate, authority and choice. We also included so-called ”lesser gods" because we find that different gods may very well be gods with worthwhile diversity rather than abject inequalities.
Now we find that, in relation to any choice, all the gods have to choose. In relation to any choice, either they choose to choose, they choose not to chose or they choose to let someone else choose for them. That whatever their choice, in relation to any choice, they are not free to escape the responsibility of their Sovereignty.
That their “Free Will” is subjected to the burden of their Sovereign Will.
How then do gods react to being forced to choose, without being asked? To the linked labels of ultimate, authority and choice, do we now have to add: rebellion? And if that is the case, don’t we also have to add: reason?